你猜对了却没拿到钱：Kalshi 的「死亡条款」困局

Kalshi faces a class action lawsuit after refusing to pay out 'yes' holders on the Khamenei market — even though they were right. The 'death carveout' clause resolved shares at last traded price, not $1.Kalshi 拒绝向正确预测哈梅内伊下台的用户全额赔付，触发集体诉讼。「死亡例外」条款将合约按最后成交价结算，而非 1 美元。

The Setup

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei died on February 28. Traders on Kalshi who held “yes” on the market “Ali Khamenei out as Supreme Leader by March 1?” expected a full $1.00 payout per share. They were right.

They didn’t get paid.

Kalshi invoked a “death carveout” — a rule buried in the market’s terms stating that if the leader left office solely because they died, the market resolves at the last traded price, not $1.00. The reasoning: Kalshi doesn’t want to run markets where people directly profit from someone’s death.

The market generated over $54 million in trading volume. Now it’s a class action lawsuit.

Key Takeaways

Rule design is the product. Kalshi’s death carveout is philosophically defensible — you probably shouldn’t create financial incentives around death events. But the plaintiffs argue the rules weren’t disclosed prominently enough. This is a UX problem as much as a legal one.
“No trader lost money” isn’t enough. Kalshi’s CEO emphasized that they reimbursed all fees and net losses. But traders didn’t enter to break even — they entered to profit from a correct prediction. The gap between “no loss” and “expected profit” is where the lawsuit lives.
$11 billion valuation, $260 in dispute. The named plaintiffs held ~$260 in positions. But the class action represents thousands of traders on a $54M-volume market. The real risk is precedent: if death carveouts are unenforceable, every prediction market needs to rethink how it handles mortality-adjacent events.

Why It Matters

Prediction markets are one of Rex’s key interest areas. This case exposes the fundamental tension in market design: rule clarity vs. ethical guardrails.

Polymarket, Kalshi, and Myriad are all racing to capture the prediction market boom. But as these platforms scale from crypto-native users to retail, hidden rule clauses become lawsuits. The platforms that survive will be the ones that solve rule transparency — not just trading UX.

For builders: this is a real example of how “terms of service” can become the most important product decision you make.

What to watch:

Court ruling on whether the death carveout was adequately disclosed — sets precedent for all prediction markets
Whether Polymarket adopts similar clauses or positions itself as “no hidden rules”
CFTC response — prediction markets are still in a regulatory gray zone, and this case draws attention

背景

2 月 28 日，伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊去世。在 Kalshi 上持有「哈梅内伊 3 月 1 日前下台？」合约 “yes” 仓位的交易者，预期每份合约获得 1 美元全额赔付。他们猜对了。

但他们没拿到钱。

Kalshi 启用了一个「死亡例外条款」——写在市场规则里的一项条款：如果领导人仅因死亡而离任，市场按最后成交价结算，而非 1 美元。理由是：Kalshi 不希望创建一个让人从他人死亡中直接获利的市场。

这个市场产生了超过 5400 万美元的交易量。现在变成了集体诉讼。

关键要点

规则设计就是产品。 Kalshi 的死亡例外条款在哲学层面是站得住脚的——你确实不应该围绕死亡事件创建金融激励。但原告认为规则披露不够充分。这既是法律问题，也是用户体验问题。
「没人亏钱」远远不够。 Kalshi CEO 强调退还了所有手续费和净损失。但交易者入场不是为了打平——他们是为了从正确预测中获利。「没有损失」和「预期收益」之间的差距，正是这场诉讼的核心。
110 亿美元估值，260 美元的争议。 指名原告持仓仅约 260 美元。但集体诉讼代表了数千名交易者，市场总成交额达 5400 万美元。真正的风险在于先例：如果死亡例外条款不可执行，所有预测市场都需要重新设计涉及死亡的事件处理方式。

为什么重要

预测市场是 Rex 的重点关注领域之一。这个案例暴露了市场设计中的根本矛盾：规则透明性 vs. 伦理护栏。

Polymarket、Kalshi、Myriad 都在抢占预测市场的爆发期。但当这些平台从加密原生用户扩展到零售用户时，隐藏的规则条款就会变成诉讼。活下来的平台，是那些解决了规则透明度的——不只是交易体验。

对 Builder 来说：这是一个「服务条款」可以成为最重要产品决策的真实案例。

值得关注：

法院对死亡例外条款是否充分披露的裁决——将为所有预测市场设立先例
Polymarket 是否采用类似条款，还是以「无隐藏规则」作为差异化定位
CFTC 的反应——预测市场仍处于监管灰色地带，这个案例会引起关注

You Were Right and Still Didn't Get Paid: Kalshi's Death Carveout Problem你猜对了却没拿到钱：Kalshi 的「死亡条款」困局

The Setup

Key Takeaways

Why It Matters

背景

关键要点

为什么重要